1: Fedotov S-4 (no date) 1954 RF1 Great Russia RF1

ooo ably well the nature of the historical process, the drama of the perpetual dissensions and crises, and the very possibility of development.

● 181 157 If today, in exile, we ask this or that émigré of the rank and file to describe the Russian character, we are sure to be offered two contrasting pictures. As often as not these different images correspond to the political camp of the émigré. To those of the Right and to those of the Left, Russia and the Russian show a different face.

Let us have a look at the left-wing image. This Russian is a lifelong seeker after truth, an enthusiast serving ideals with self-sacrificial ardor but frequently changing his gods and idols. He is utterly devoted to the people, to art, to ideas; eager to become a martyr for some noble cause; an irreconcilable foe of dishonesty, of compromise. An extremist in his dedication to ideas, he lives in the clouds and is estranged from reality—rootless, yet a saint in the full meaning of the word, a saint above material interests. Of the four elements, he is closest to fire and most alien to the earth—and yet he wishes to serve the earth, envisaging this service in terms of flame, conflagration, molten metal. In terms of religion, his is the eschatological type of Christianity—without a terrestrial home, but thirsting for the City of God. Or rather in search of a "New Heaven" and a "New Earth." He loathes nothing so much as moderation, regularity, the virtues of restraint and reasonableness, the smugness of a self-complacent culture. Culture, as the realm of consummate form, leaves him cold; he dreams of remolding all forms in his own crucible. The process of creation is more important to him than its product, the search for truth more important than truth itself, heroic death more important than a life full of labor. Usually he regards Belinsky as his ancestor and (today!) Dostoevsky as his supreme spokesman. It is not difficult to recognize in this image the self-portrait of the Russian intelligentsia,—not of the Russian educated class as a whole, but of that "order" whose origin goes back to the eighteen thirties.

181 517 However, the intelligentsia, this latest layer of Russian culture, is not entirely lacking in national roots—or, more exactly, counterparts. For here we have to do not with the direct influence of deep popular forces but with the obscure subconscious play of the folk-soul, which in the destiny of these pseudo-renegades of nation and country repeats the features of another type, deeply embedded in the national psyche. Apostates, runaways, seekers, pilgrims—are

1: Fedotov S-4 (no date) 1954 RF1 Great Russia RF1

found not only on the upper level but also in the lowest stratum of the people. We meet them among the adherents of the numerous religious sects as well as among the wider circle of spiritually disturbed Russian men and women, restless seekers after religious truth. They embody the kenotic, Christ-centered brand of Russian religiosity, eternally opposed to the prevailing ritualism in liturgy and customs. These kenotic forces of folk religiosity were released by the schism of the seventeenth century, when the Church lost its former unity. The quest for a new spiritual haven began with the first doubts about the absolute orthodoxy of the Muscovite-Petersburg tsardom. Thus this national type, so vividly brought to life by the Russian literature of the nineteenth century, while comparatively of late formation, is yet much older than the intelligentsia and approximately coincides with the Empire. This does not mean that it did not spring from more ancient sources: it had a forerunner in the kenotic type of ancient Russian holiness. But its estrangement from reality, its restlessness, stamp it as a spiritual phenomenon belonging to modern history.

It is interesting to note that the Russian intelligentsia, beside its popular counterparts, has still another parallel, ever more noticeable towards the close of the nineteenth century. It is the Jewish parallel. It is not an accident that ever since the eighties, with the beginning of the exodus from the ghetto, an intimate fusion of the Russian-Jewish intelligentsia became apparent—not only in the common revolutionary struggle but in all spiritual aspirations and the essential attitude towards life: the ardent rootlessness, the eschatological prophetism. It was a spiritual atmosphere which in its intensity recalls early Christianity—deprived, however, of the central pivot of faith and therefore apt to breed aberrations of the most fanatically sectarian kind. Russian reactionaries are right in linking the intelligentsia with Judaism. But they distort the historical perspective in representing the Jews as the seducers of innocent Russian youth. The "order" of the Russian intelligentsia had long been in existence and had taken up the fight against autocracy at a time when the influx from the ghetto—attracted by spiritual affinity—had hardly begun. It is this affinity that makes the short-sighted Western observer describe the "âme slave" in Jewish terms. While many are inclined to view the Zionist endeavor in Palestine as the work of Russian intellectuals, Spengler regards the coteries of the Russian intelligentsia—which he abhors—as reflecting the spirit and tradition of the Talmudists. There certainly

1: Fedotov S-4 (no date) 1954 RF1 Great Russia RF1

181 517 was prevalent a specific Russian-Jewish atmosphere, of which a Jewish poet has said: "Blessed he who ever breathed that air."

000 And yet, only a foreigner may be forgiven for not distinguishing between Slavic and Semitic features in the amalgam of the intellectual-sectarian type. Surely there was nothing Jewish in Belinsky; and when Tolstoy spoke of Dostoevsky's Jewishness, he meant it, of course, in the widest metaphorical sense. The difference is subtle but plainly perceptible—rather one of style, of aesthetic pattern, than of ethical contents—which, after all, is true of most national distinctions. The kinship between the intelligentsia and popular sectarianism, on the other hand, is a primary phenomenon, sufficient in itself to establish this type of intellectual as one of the historical formations of the Russian soul.

181 157 I believe that many, and not only among the right-wingers, will refuse to acknowledge the intelligentsia as the deepest manifestation of Russianness. To myself, whenever today, in exile, I try to conjure up a pure image of the Russian, he presents himself under a different aspect. Profound calm, taciturnity, on the surface even apathy. An organic aversion for anything high-flown, high-strung, extravagant. Simplicity often carried so far as to shun a word, a gesture too much. "Silence is golden." Serene, self-confident power. The silence reflects profound Oriental experience absorbed in the blood. Hence a strain of fatalism. Hence also the humor—the tolerant smile at the foreground of life, at the ceaseless fretting and fussing of the intellect. Humor and restraint are features this type of Russian shares with the Anglo-Saxon. In the opinion of some, by the way, only the Russians and the English possess a genuine sense of humor. Tolstoy and his set—the "high society" of Anna Karenina—in all of Europe felt most at home in the Anglo-Saxon world, the only one they respected. However, this superficial similarity covers a vastly divergent experience—Western activism and Oriental fatalism; but in both worlds the violence of elemental forces was tamed by centuries-old discipline.

I shall not attempt here to define the moral aspect of this type of Russian. I believe that, as a rule, one should avoid over-precise moral characterizations of national types. The good and the wicked, the vicious and the pure are found among all of them, probably in the same proportion. What matters are the shades of goodness, of purity etc., the "how" and not the "what,"—which means definitions rather in aesthetic (in the widest sense) terms. Is the Russian kind? Quite often he is. When he is, his kindness combined with

1: Fedotov S-4 (no date) 1954 RF1 Great Russia RF1

his own peculiar quiet wisdom, produces one of the finest human types. How we long for it in our warped life, swayed as we are by all kinds of passions—and be it spiritual passions! But the Russian can be cruel too—this we know well by now—and not only in a brief flare-up of fury but in a smugly callous, ruthlessly selfish way. Most often he amazes us by a kind of Oriental indifference to the lot and the sufferings of others—coupled with gentleness and superficial compassion (Karataev!). There is something Chinese in the impassive attitude of the Russian peasant towards his own and his fellowmen's death. This kind of wisdom takes us beyond the limits of Christianity. Tolstoy was profoundly aware of the primeval, prehistoric roots of this indifference ("The Three Deaths").

Nor is it easy to generalize about the volitional nature of the Russian. Is he indolent or active? More often than not he appears lazy; he works under pressure, pulling himself together only at the very last; but then he does not spare himself and is capable of making up in a few days for months of idleness. But there are also Russians of dogged industry, performing their tasks with restrained but intense passion; such were to be found among kulaks, inventors, scientists, even administrators. The amorphous mass of the people readily submits to the leadership of this sturdy élite, while seldom respecting it. Without this ruthless and strong-willed type the creation of the Empire, and even of the Muscovite state, would have been unthinkable.

In mentioning the Muscovite state, we are offering a clue to the understanding of this second brand of Russian. Its embodiment is the Muscovite, as his hard historical destinies have shaped him. For two or three centuries rough hands had been at work kneading the Slavic dough, knocking, bruising, breaking in the recalcitrant stuff, molding it into an extremely tenacious form. The Petrine Empire overlaid the Muscovite tsardom with a varnish of European culture, but it was still the Muscovite type that remained the real mainstay. To this type belong all those classes that were little touched by the Petersburg culture. All the clergy, the merchant class, the thrifty part of the peasantry (insofar as it was not undermined by spiritual restlessness). We meet this type again in the great Russian literature, where it is, however, pushed into the background by later spiritual formations. It is reflected most vividly in the regional literature—the writings of Aksakov, Leskov, Melnikov, Mamin-Sibiriak. And Tolstoy, of course. Although he cannot be fitted altogether into the Muscovite mold, he stemmed from it, had a

1: Fedotov S-4 (no date) 1954 RF1 Great Russia RF1

181 157 538 deep fondness for this type, and was apt to idealize it. Karataev, Kutuzov, Levin are Muscovites; and so are Captain Mironov and Maxim Maximovich—Muscovite state servants who have survived the Petrine upheaval. The plodding official under Nicholas I, so ill-treated by the satirical literature of the time, represents the last layer of the Muscovite formation. We meet this type also on the highest cultural level: Pososhkov, Bolotov, the Aksakovs, Zabelin, Kliuchevsky—all these are authentic Muscovites. Here is the source of Russian creative power—which, however, like all things ultra-national, is rather limited in outlook. The narrow-mindedness of Tolstoy and Mussorgsky can assume truly tragical forms.

181 157 Such are the two polar types of Russianness, to whose conflict the high drama of the nineteenth century is largely due. They may be regarded as the expression of the basic dualism inherent in the Russian soul. They are, however, only the latest historically conditioned manifestations of this duality. Of all the successive cultural layers of the Russian soul, they represent the Muscovite stratum and that latest formation, the intelligentsia, born in the eighteen-thirties. But the historical approach to the problem of the Russian character makes it imperative to look beyond the limits of this duality. Between Muscovy and the intelligentsia there lies the Empire. Nor did Russia begin with Muscovy. What remains today of the Russian of the Empire, the Russian of the Kievan era, of Novgorod?

When, basing our claim on Pushkin, we assert with Dostoevsky that the Russian is a universalist, and that in this lies his national mission, it is actually the imperial Russian we have in mind. Universality is characteristic neither of the Muscovite nor of a true representative of the intelligentsia. On the contrary, the distinctive feature of both is narrow-mindedness, sectarianism. The Petrine reform, however, had brought Russia out into the open spaces of the world, had placed her at the crossroads of all the great Western civilizations and had brought into being the species of the Russian-European. His main attribute is freedom and openness of mind—such as to set him apart not only from the Muscovite but also from the European of the West. European culture, taken as a whole, was more intensely alive on the banks of the Neva or Moskva than on those of the Seine, the Thames, or the Spree. It is this imperial upper-class stratum that has given rise to the myth of the Russian's peculiar gift for foreign languages. Actually the average Russian,

1: Fedotov S-4 (no date) 1954 RF1 Great Russia RF1

whether Muscovite or of the intelligentsia, is totally devoid of linguistic ability and finds it hard to adjust himself to strange countries and alien surroundings. But the Russian-European felt at home everywhere.

Throughout the two centuries of his existence, we have known him in two incarnations: the wanderer and the builder. Weak natures were easily crushed by the wealth of the alien culture. The conflict between the traditional Russian values and those of the new Westernized life was apt to generate skepticism, shallowness and premature weariness. Beginning with the "petits-maîtres" of the eighteenth century, "whose hearts belonged to the French Crown," a long chain of so-called "superflous people," including the Onegins, Rudins, Raiskys, stretches across Russian literature. Not so long ago it was customary to regard this as the basic trend of Russian life. This is a stupendous misunderstanding, a historical-literary aberration. We are well acquainted with another type of Russian-European—one that had retained the strong will of the Muscovite, his bond with the motherland, and sometimes even his religious faith. It was men like these who built the Empire, who fought its wars and made its laws, who sowed the seeds of enlightenment. Such were "the fledglings of Peter's nest," although in fairness it must be admitted that this type had come into being before Peter's time. Its genealogy begins with the Boyar Matveev, with Ordyn-Nashchokin, maybe even with Kurbsky. They reached their culminating point in the era of Alexander I. Under him they occupied the highest government posts. There was no rift yet between government and culture. Pushkin, "the bard of Empire and of freedom," was the last great embodiment of that imperial type. It did not, however, completely disappear even after the break between monarchy and culture under Nicholas I. In the "Era of the Great Reforms" the "Russian-Europeans" for a time came again into their own. We saw "the last Mohicans" of the type ourselves in the Senate and the Imperial Council under the last two tsars; deprived of power and influence, they still retained their rich experience, their political wisdom, alas! no longer needed by the degenerate dynasty. But on a lower level, within the administration, the courts, the liberal professions, the local self-government, and, of course, the universities, it was largely the "Europeans" who carried on their shoulders the whole burden of cultural activities under excruciatingly difficult conditions. Nearly always they shunned politics in order to concentrate on the only tasks open to them.

1: Fedotov S-4 (no date) 1954 RF1 Great Russia RF1

181 157 Hence their lack of popularity in a country that for generations had been breathing the exhalations of civil war. Nevertheless, in every city, every district, these zealots of culture left some achievement behind them—here a school, there a learned society, a model farm, or just the memory of a dedicated physician, a humane judge, a noble man. It was they who preserved Russia from stagnating and freezing up at a time when every effort was made from above to put her on ice, and from below to set her aflame. While the Muscovite formed the backbone of Russia, the Russian-European was her builder. However, as we have pointed out, this creative, constructive type derived itself from Muscovite roots. While his lifework often compelled the "European" to wage a tenacious fight against the Muscovite's inertia and indolence, he yet shared with the latter a common moral ideal, a common love of Russia and her "soul." Kliuchevsky's history and Russian music were his link with Moscow. Whenever this link crumbled away, he would become a rolling-stone, no longer capable of constructive work. Under certain circumstances he might turn into an "intellectual"; this is the upper-class source of the intelligentsia, quite distinct from its democratic springs. But so long as he stood at his post, performing some vital task, he remained loyal to Russia and to the Muscovite principle of service. In the beginning of the twentieth century, notably after the revolution of 1905, the creative Russian-European element showed signs of impetuous growth at the expense of the intelligentsia. It looked as if the future belonged to it. . . . Fate decided differently.

181 What features of the Russian may be traced to the early Russia of warring principalities and free city-republics? Fully aware that we are embarking upon arbitrary and even fantastic speculations, we yet venture an answer: that aspect of the Russian character usually called its "largeness"; its unruliness; its rebelliousness—neither ideological nor sectarian—but rooted in a deep organic aversion to any kind of rigid form. Even today, the Russian heart still responds to the ancient chronicles, to the "Lay of Prince Igor." To state it boldly: it is not the stern builders of Empire, and not the statesmen, who most strongly appeal to Russian national emotions, but the knightly princes, the dare-devil Mstislavs, the Viking Sviatoslav, the tumultuous freedom of Novgorod. Muscovy certainly never succeeded in wholly disciplining the Slavic unruliness. It erupted in the free Cossack communities, in the sporadic uprisings; in the nineteenth century it found an outlet in debauchery and high living, in fantastic dissipation, in the bohemianism and

l: Fedotov S-4 (no date) 1954 RF1 Great Russia RF1

artistic trend of the Russian character. This side of the Russian soul finds a most adequate expression in the gipsy song and dance. Russian debauchery is often somber and heavy, an effect, maybe, of Tartar blood and Muscovite oppression; but it can also be gay, generous, magnanimous. Such were the revelries of Pushkin, who combined Europeanism with Russian reckless freedom. Many talented Russians have succumbed to their nature (A. Grigoriev); and yet this characteristic, so long as it is to some extent held in check by self-discipline and education, is inseparable from Russian genius. "How fond I am of drunks!" Tolstoy once inadvertently confessed.

Gloom and childlike gaiety are the two poles of Russian unruliness. In the mood of youthful light-heartedness, generosity, sparkling high spirits, the Russian character is at its most attractive. This gaiety, however, is ephemeral. Unaccountable joy does not satisfy the Russian for long. He is likely to come to a grim and tragic end. If he fails to settle down in time (Muscovite fashion), his end is a ruined life, or a monk's hood.

Is it possible to penetrate still deeper into the Russian soul—beyond Kiev and Novgorod, beyond the threshold of history? If we remove, like skin after skin from a bulb, the successive cultural layers deposited by history, shall we find in the Russian a central irreducible core? It may be that our question is not posed correctly. The national soul is not given in history. The ethnic psyche serves only as the raw material of history. That psyche, moreover, is not all of a piece: Slavs, Finns, Turks,—all have gone into the making of the Russian soul. A nation is not a tree or an animal whose potentialities are all enclosed in the seed. The nation is rather to be compared to a musical or poetical work whose first measures or lines do not necessarily convey the main theme. Sometimes this theme is not revealed until the very end. It may be that in this sense (as revelation of an idea) the nineteenth century was more truly national than Kiev or Muscovy. Without assuming in any way that Slavic paganism contained in embryo the idea of Russianness (how could we differentiate here between Eastern and Southern Slavs—between Russians and Bulgars or Serbs?)—we yet believe it worthwhile to peer into this mysterious depth. Better than other civilized peoples we have preserved the organic, pre-Christian foundations of the national soul. Deep at the root of the greatest masterpieces of Russian literature there is something akin to the primitivism of folklore. Tiutchev, Tolstoy, Rozanov have distilled, as it

1: Fedotov S-4 (no date) 1954 RF1 Great Russia RF1

were, in the apparatus of high spiritual pressure, the primordial stuff of Russian paganism.

Where shall we look for a key to it? We cannot go here beyond a few suggestions, the first steps leading down into the subterranean galleries of the Russian soul. Some time ago W. W. Weidlé (*Sovremennye Zapiski*, No. 64) attempted, rightly so in my opinion, to link this Russian essence with the family principle. As late as the nineteenth century, the Russian-Slav was not yet wholly estranged from Mother-Earth. His intimate union with the world of nature makes individual existence difficult and strange. Nature for him is not landscape, not a background for his daily life, and still less, of course, an object of conquest. He is embedded in her as in the maternal womb; he responds to her with all his being; apart from her he dries up and cannot live. He has not realized yet the frightfulness of her ruthless beauty, the frightfulness of death—since there is nothing in him that can die. All that is valuable and lofty in the human being is generic, communal, indestructible. And that which is individual is not worth immortality. The moral law of the individual, his right to his own conscience, to self-determination—these things have no validity in face of the law of life. In the moral sphere this attitude leads to communal, collective ethics based on the principle of mutual responsibility. In art it generates an enormous power of sensuous perception and suggestion (derived from Gea, the Earth), which is offset by weakness of form and of individual creative design. In the pursuit of knowledge it leads, of course, to irrationalism and reliance on intuition. In work and social life it leads to distrust of all planning, system, organization. The Slavophile ideal, for all its consciously Christian character, is strongly imbued with this pagan element of the Slavic psyche. In the life of the common people, however, we find it already sublimated by the Church and, this has led to the widely held assumption that it forms the very essence of Eastern Christianity. Actually it has nothing to do with Christianity; rather it takes us far eastwards. Another step, and we are in India with her total obliteration of the individual.

The question arises: where in this historically stratified scheme of the Russian soul is its Christian, its Orthodox layer? The truth is that there is more than one such layer, since there are actually as many brands of Russian Christianity as there are historical types of the Russian, and maybe more. Just as every nation experiences Christianity in its own way, so every cultural stratum of a nation

1: Fedotov S-4 (no date) 1954 RF1 Great Russia RF1

has its own key to Christianity, or at least its own nuances of it. There is no need, however, to distinguish between fine shades of Christianity in the Russian soul; all the contradictions stand out with stark boldness. Just try to express in one formula the religiosity of St. Sergius and the Archpriest Avvakum, that of the Metropolitan Philaret and of Dostoevsky. For good measure, add to these Greek-Orthodox folklore and the religion of Tolstoy!

The opinion is widely held that the Russian people are set apart from other European peoples by the peculiar intensity of their religiosity. Actually this impression derives from the fact that the twentieth century finds Russia and the rest of Europe in different acts of the religious-historical drama. In Russia, among the great mass of the people, the Middle Ages lived on right down to the middle of the nineteenth century. The Europe of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries would offer a closer analogy to imperial Russia. But the collapse of Russian medievalism was stormy and destructive in the extreme. Today the attitude towards religion, both on the part of the masses and of the intelligentsia, is not markedly different from that in other European countries.

. . . And now let us turn to our basic problem: which historical layers of the Russian soul have been destroyed by the Revolution and which will survive it? The answer now should be clear. The extermination of the old educated class and the suppression of all the sources that fed it were bound to remove the two uppermost strata from the spiritual structure of Russian society. The man of Empire and the intellectual perished together with the "bourgeoisie," the upper layer of the old society. As to the imperial type, the Russian of universal culture, some relics of it still survive within the ranks of the "specialists." Some time ago, the [Soviet] government belatedly realized that the liquidation of the upper cultural stratum was doing irreparable harm to technical progress. The surviving old-timers became the object of special attention. However, they were valued only in their capacity of specialists in some narrow field; as has been wittily said, golden watches were used to drive in nails. Their broad culture, no longer needed by anyone and even offensive to the new ruling class, still subsists within some tiny groups or even families. The new educated class produces exclusively specialists who often lack the rudiments of a general culture, even plain literacy. On the other hand, never since the Muscovite tsardom has Russia been fenced off from Europe by such a high wall. This wall has been erected not only by censorship and

1: Fedotov S-4 (no date) 1954 RF1 Great Russia RF1

178 the ban on foreign travel, but also by inordinate conceit and out-
● 181 right contempt for decaying bourgeois Europe. Here lies the es-
517 sential difference between the semi-literate technical intelligentsia of Tsar Peter and a similar intelligentsia under Stalin. That of Stalin has deliberately turned its back on Europe and in so doing has cut short the line of the "universal" Russian.

More complex was the fate of the intelligentsia proper. By the time the revolution broke out, this extraordinary formation had already lost its former vitality. After 1905 the intelligentsia began to dissolve, losing its identity within the whole of the "cultured" class. It was unable to survive the collapse of its political mysticism, desecrated by the pathetic Russian constitutionalism; the new brilliant religious-philosophical culture of the Russian renaissance of the twentieth century demoralized it with its many seductions; the war drew it into the stream of a national consciousness new to it. By 1917 the revolutionary enthusiasm of the intelligentsia was already a warmed-up dish. Its roots did not go deep, and the size of this social group, the only one to give loyal support to the Provisional Government, had shrunk considerably. The October Revolution hit it with all its weight. Dedicated to principles and uncompromising, the intelligentsia was utterly unable to acquiesce in the triumph of brute force. No wonder that the struggle against the new rulers bled it white. The few who survived either went into exile or filled Soviet prisons and concentration camps. Some managed to adjust themselves to the conditions of Soviet bureaucracy and turned into "specialists," gradually losing the last features of their noble "order." The mills of a brutal way of life were grinding without mercy. In the words of a Russian proverb—"to live with wolves one has to howl with them." Those unable to adjust themselves were cast out of the new life. The new intelligentsia now emerging is organically devoted to the Soviet régime; it feels a blood kinship with both the people and the ruling class. And for this reason it can never—not even in opposition, not even (let us anticipate the future) engaged in a revolutionary struggle against those in power—degenerate into that rootlessly-ideological, extremist, and eschatological type, let alone the dedicated fraternity we call the Russian intelligentsia.

However, this defunct Russian type is not entirely without successors. Sectarianism and spiritual journeying have not died out in the people, as insistently testified by the "godless" press. The Revolution has even given rise to some new sectarian formations,

1: Fedotov S-4 (no date) 1954 RF1 Great Russia RF1

usually of an eschatological nature. On the other hand, part of the old intelligentsia have found a spiritual foothold in the Church. Here the last remnants of the vanished "order" can quench their spiritual thirst from the same spring that, unknown to them, had generated it. Within the Church they have, of course, preserved their psychological characteristics: their restlessness and extremism, their thirst for an integrated, consecrated life. Here they find themselves on common ground with the searchers and pilgrims of the people. One should keep in mind that the spiritual barrier between Church and dissenters is no longer what it was before the Revolution. Persecution has brought the various creeds closer together. The remnants of the old intelligentsia act as a ferment upon the whole religious mass. So far, however, this force has either been completely eliminated from all constructive cultural work or else has voluntarily turned away from it. Insofar as Russian culture of the immediate future is concerned, the old type of intellectual is definitely extinct.

What remains is the Muscovite with his vague ancestral heritage. The masses of the people who, molded by Soviet schools, produce the new human being, until quite recently lived and thought after the Muscovite pattern. The most radical ideological upheaval is powerless wholly to remake a spiritual mold. In the internationalist, the Marxist of today, whoever he may be, it is easy to recognise the village lad, the factory worker, as we remember them from the turn of the century. Paradoxical as it may sound, *homo Europaeo-Americanus* seems closer to Muscovy than to the more recent Petersburg era. The paradox is easily explained. *Homo Europaeo-Americanus* has little claim on the rich heritage of Europe's culture. He emerged in Europe in the period of her barbarization and assimilated a civilization already narrowed down to its athletic, technical, military contents. The savage of our time, technician or athlete, is the product of the disintegration of ancient culture going hand in hand with the absorption of barbarians into the civilized world. The Muscovite who, biding his time in rural Russia, outlasted two centuries of imperial culture, does not need any great effort to keep step with a Europe that has come to curse the last two centuries of her history. What might seem really amazing is the ease with which religion has been repudiated. But this is a special, highly complex theme. As to everything else, the Muscovite lout only had to be shaken up and kicked around for a while, to be jolted out of his indolence and sluggishness. What the tsarist barracks once did to

1: Fedotov S-4 (no date) 1954 RF1 Great Russia RF1

● /8/ the recruit, the Party and the Komsomol are doing today—training country bumpkins and turning them into disciplined soldiers. The Muscovite provides admirable material for discipline, military discipline in particular. He formed the backbone of the old imperial army, the best in the world, maybe, in quality of manpower. The age-old habit of obedience, the weakness of individual consciousness and of the desire for freedom, the greater ease of living within a collective body and of working in a team—all this forms a bond between the Soviet citizen and Muscovy of yore. Muscovy had by no means been poor in social forces, rather the reverse; they had been so strong as to smother the individual; it was not without reason that the Muscovite national economy had a semi-socialist character. Stalin today consciously strives to establish himself as the successor of the tsars and the hetmans. Tsar and Pugachov in one. . . . The transfer of the capital back to Moscow is a symbolic act. The Revolution has failed to destroy the Russian national type but has appallingly crippled and impoverished it.

The Russian unruliness is, of course, indestructible. It was strong in the Muscovite tsardom; it is still there under Stalin. It ran riot in the violence of the first years of the Revolution; it finds a blatant outlet today in the debauchery which constantly undermines the foundations of Communist discipline; it is alive in the reckless daring of Russian fliers and arctic explorers. All that is colorful today in Russian life and Russian art is reminiscent of the heroic periods of Russian history. Russian unruliness, while not the same as freedom, still saves the face of contemporary Russia from the universal, uniform stigma of slavery. Strong natures still seek and find outlets for their energy. And the presence of these forces strengthens our hope of liberation—however remote it may still appear.

000 And what about the deepest—Slavic-pagan—layers of the Russian soul? To what extent have they been preserved? This we do not know. The powerful process of rationalization ruthlessly destroys all that is subconscious and elemental, fills up all the deep wells, renders the Russian character shallow and transparent. But is the process completed? Are there no remote corners left where ancient beliefs are still alive, where the primordial bond with Mother-Earth has not been broken? After all, village sorcery and shamanism are by no means dead, as we are informed from time to time by Soviet ethnographers. Why should there not be traces somewhere of the dimmer and subtler complexes of the tribal pantheistic psyche? We know that something of this must be there; surely Prishvin does not

6: Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RF1 Great Russia RF1

121 voke changes in the system of political relations (power structure) and hence in the social structure.

121
181 Two contrasting cultures, that of the power-seeking and self-oriented nomadic horsemen of the Eurasian steppes, and that of the anarchic and group-oriented tillers of the land in the river basins of eastern Europe, provide valuable data for an understanding of the formation of political elites in Russian society, and particularly for identification of conflicting orientations which have been at the root of its social instability and political aggression throughout ages of its growth. There were other sources of conditioning circumstances which have provided significant elements to the content of Russia's culture and its social structure and which have affected the recruitment of political elites and the formation of ideologies. Such were, for instance, the Byzantine system of the administration and of the Church-State relations, the conditions of serfdom and the retarded growth of middle classes, and Western European technology and political and social philosophies. There were also "external" pressures which—in conjunction with Russia's geographic location—have influenced its social and political development. Such, for instance, were the quality of Russia's soil and climate, the moving of the trade routes from the Dnieper valley toward the West in the late middle ages, the sudden growth and disintegration of the Mongol empire, the formation and the expansion of Western European and of Pacific imperial systems. A number of these agents, however, have tended to perpetuate the initial basic structure and to intensify the clash of views of life which was introduced into Russian society through the imposition of the rule of the steppe nomads over the tillers of the land in the ancient past.

[157] One of the basic traits in the interpersonal and institutional relationships of the horse-breeders from the steppes consists of an apparent want of lasting emotional attachments, of social trust and of ties of moral unity. There is a lack of stability in loyalties and therefore a system of power which is self-oriented, that is, based on personal drives for aggrandizement. Only continuing conquests and lasting threats of common external enemies can assure the perpetuation of this predatory system

6 Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RFl Great Russia RFl

of rule. The defeat or death of the ruler, as much as lack of constant external pressures, are likely to bring about a sudden disintegration of a political structure based on such foundations. 121 181

Want of human attachments in the society of these steppe marauders might have been brought about by a strong feeling of insecurity which seems to be rooted in the physical as well as in the social environment of these people. Nomadic horse-breeding in the steppes and deserts, abusive dominance and humiliating submission in a despotic family organization, autocratic political system, sharply stratified social structure, and predatory warfare of enemy tribes present constant physical and emotional threats which breed deep fears, anxieties, lack of trust and violent hostilities. These conditions are harmful to the growth of social intimacy and to the development of group identifications and solidarities; they are likely to favor formation of a self-centered personality and to foster an urge for extreme power-seeking and destructive action as a means of personal survival. [154]

Contrasted to the society of these power-oriented and predatory warriors of the steppes, was the group-oriented and anarchic culture of the Old-Slavonic soil cultivators, spreading since remote times over the forest plains and along the river valleys between the upper Volga and the Carpathians. This society represented a stable system of self-contained and autonomous small agricultural communities with equalitarian social and family organization, diffused social power, lack of central political authority, lack of sharp economic or social stratification and lack of coerciveness. Interpersonal and institutional relationships in these communities promoted group intimacy and social cohesion; they discouraged self-seeking, destructive aggressiveness and warlike qualities. But as the nomadic warriors, in the course of their centuries-old invasions, were imposing their rule over this egalitarian and stateless social system, significant changes were taking place in the Old-Slavonic world; these have formed the basis for the formation and the growth of Russian society. [156]

One of the most important innovations consisted of the formation of a ruling class of conquerors whose whole view of life was in complete contrast to the social and political philosophy of the

6: Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RF1 Great Russia RF1

[IX century]

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subjected agricultural population. In the ruling class of conquerors—who were marrying the native women—the steppe traditions of an unlimited paternal power, centered in a God-like, distant and strict father, tended to prevail. The principles of seniority, of priority of the male sex and of super-ordination and subordination among brothers and sisters favored sibling rivalry in this family system. At the same time, the mother, following her native traditions, tended to assert her marital equality, to maintain separate property rights, to teach her children the native speech and customs, and to protect them against the caprice and wrath of a domineering and warlike father.

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It is likely that children in such families of clashing marital and social philosophies might be exposed to alternating experiences of rejection and over-protection; they might develop an exaggerated self-concern and power-orientation, as well as feelings of inadequacy and dependence. Extremes in emotional reactions ranging from blind submission to destructive aggression and violent revolt tend to develop in such circumstances.

Such traits which contain a core of emotional instability and perpetual strife did not seem to be favorable for the growth and consolidation of State. Instead, a number of small principalities were formed, whose ruling strata were torn by internal rivalries and splits, and by never-ending parricidal and fratricidal feuds. Moreover, these petty princes and war chieftains, following steppe tradition, were interested in waging warfare more than in promoting agriculture or industry—which was contrary to the view of life and the social philosophy of the subjected population. There was, therefore, a lack of common culture, lack of common interests and want of social solidarity between the subjects and their warlike lords. Such a situation fomented social unrest; local riots and mass uprisings, which in turn promoted increasing rigidity of controls, centralization of power, never-ending internal splits and never-ending warfare.

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By the ninth century A.D., these turbulent warriors came into conflict with the Byzantine Empire which had a political interest in the same area. This contact with Byzantium was of far-reaching consequence, because it introduced the Eastern Church into the social and political structure of Russian society. This institu-

6: Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RF1 Great Russia RF1

175 642 cratic Czar. By the time of Ivan the Terrible, the power of the independent landed aristocracy was suppressed, and the autocratic power rested now on a service nobility who were given lands in conditional possession depending upon their service and their loyalty to the Czar. These people therefore found themselves in a slave-like dependency upon the ruler who was likened to God, a situation that promoted political and social regimentation and fostered domineering-subservience relationships, thus intensifying the existing incompatibilities between the upper and lower strata of the Czardom.

[157] Domineering-subservience relationships are likely to breed humiliating experiences of self-abasement and feelings of wounded self-esteem which in turn might foster intense hostilities as well as compensatory ideas of grandeur. Thus in new circumstances, both self-seeking and power-orientation were reinforced in the upper strata, and manifested themselves in the oppressive rule of the nobility, in their extreme factionalism, and in their ruthless struggle for personal power and for the favors of the Czar.

[566] This trend of events, by the second part of the sixteenth century, led to establishment of serfdom and to direct interference of the service nobility and of the government in the communal and family relations of the peasantry. From this time on, the Church, the State and the landlords joined hands in strengthening the power of the Father and of the village elders and sponsoring in the peasant family and in the village community, dominance-submission relationships, absolute power and dependence, blind obedience and self-abnegation.

• 181 [579] The inevitable clash of this new power-oriented social philosophy with the old stateless and equalitarian values, was reflected in intense family and community tensions and in mass restlessness. Thus a weakening of power and of controls on any level—family, local, or national—opened the way to urges of destructive aggression and revolt against all the holders of power: the fathers, the village elders, the landlords, the Church and the Czar. Outbreaks of such extreme enmity were manifested in frequent communal riots, in mass vagrancy, in bloody revolutionary uprisings, and in widespread dissent from the official

6: Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RFl Great Russia RFl

Church. In these protest movements on the folk level, demand for acceptance on equal terms in an all-human brotherhood of men was emphasized. 181

In the meantime, with the increasing technological, economic, and intellectual advance of the West, the Western pressures against the Czardom were intensified. In order to meet this challenge and withstand the threat, the Czardom, by the time of Peter the Great, embarked on a series of reforms aimed at Westernization of the Empire, such as secularization of the State, bureaucratization, industrialization and mass education. As a result of such developments, a new elite of parvenu salaried bureaucracy, and of parvenu salaried military, distinguished by the rank and not by the possession of land, was gradually taking the place of the old service nobility as the main pillar of the Czardom. At the same time, the old nobility who were freed of their obligatory service to the State, became hereditary owners of their estates. [177] 565

In this manner, the old service nobility evolved into a class of economically independent landed squires, even though losing their former political status and privileges, such as monopoly on land and on service. This new gentry however, were by tradition, upbringing, and personal traits, interested in ruling, in political and military careers, not in land cultivation or industry. Many of them, when without office, tended to lead a life of leisure, and to emulate Western manners and styles, to cultivate arts and letters and to indulge in philosophical speculation and formulation of political theories. Few showed an inclination to identify themselves with the productive strata of the population and to devote time and energy to improve techniques of economic production and management. [517]

Such an attitude of the nobility was an important agent in the retarded economic growth of Russia and in the lack of development of a numerically strong and influential middle class, which might have served as a cementing force in a culturally and ideologically split society. And it was from among this leisured class of rural gentry who had lost their status as the main pillar of the Czardom, but who had also emancipated themselves from their economic dependency upon the Czar, that the first

1 [i.e. from the second half of the XVI century -- Analyst]

6: Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RF1 Great Russia RF1

174 to maintain a system of economic self-sufficiency which was restricted to small villages or groups of such villages.[1]

175 181 In early documents these Old-Slavonic plowmen are described as peaceful, moderate, mild, and humane, patient and sober, disinterested in power, hard working, living in social and political democracy. They are pictured as being opposed to subjection, but unable to offer much resistance to a foreign aggressor since they were not skilled in warfare. Procopius (6th century), for instance, said that "these people are not ruled by one man, but they have lived from of old under a democracy, and consequently everything which involves their welfare, whether for good or for ill, is referred to the people."[2] And Emperor Leo (9th century) stated the following:

> . . . jealous of their liberty they have always refused to submit themselves to the Empire. . . . even those who have accepted Christianity keep as much as they can the forms of their ancient freedom. . . . This is a numerous nation, patient in difficult times, and very industrious. Heat, cold, hunger, and want of all things do not beat down these people. . . . They used to be very hospitable and still maintain with great care this virtue. They are affable people and receive travellers with much kindness, show them the way, and protect them against insult. If a traveller would not be well treated by his host because of host's fault all the people would attack the host. They behave with much gentleness also toward their slaves; they do not condemn them to perpetual slavery, but fix a time of service . . . after which time . . . they free them. The women are well-behaved, and attached to their husbands. . . . These people are very frugal . . . they prefer to live with much freedom. . . . They like to take refuge in the woods or in inaccessible places.[3]

175 631 [565] The people of Polesie seem to have been politically organized in a system of smaller groupings of self-governing villages or even in single autonomous villages connected among themselves, not in the form of a central authority or state, but rather as a loose confederation of independent units. Apparently, there were no marked social distinctions or differences in class and rank in this society. There was no aristocracy, no separate class of priests or warriors, no cities, no temples. There was, therefore, no class or clique which sought power and expansion over others,

6: Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RF1 Great Russia RF1

II

The Slavonic soil cultivators, depending upon economic self-sufficiency and cooperative effort in marshy and forest regions, as well as in the steppes, practiced a system of joint-family ownership of land (zadruga system). But when nomadic warriors imposed their rule over the tillers of the soil, the invaders considered the land over which they ruled to be their property and forced the peasants who were settled on it to pay them tribute in grain and other agricultural produce. According to the expanded version of the *Pravda Ruskaya,* for instance, after the death of a *smerd* (peasant) his sons would inherit the land, but if there were no sons the property went to the prince.

It is possible that already at that time some of the Asiatic conquerors occasionally divided and redistributed the land among the peasants according to the changing size of their families, the ability to till it and pay taxes and tithes. This might have been the most expedient way by which the conquerors sought to increase the income from the lands which they controlled. At the same time the peasants that formed a land commune were held jointly responsible by their over-lords for a predetermined amount of tributes, as well as for criminal acts committed on their territory.

The system of joint community responsibility was a well-known practice in the society of steppe nomads. It was especially applied as a means to procure fines and force the payment of debts. In that social system if a wrong-doer was unable to pay a fine, his nearest relatives, and failing them, the whole camp, had to provide it.[10] Therefore when these predatory herdsmen imposed their rule over the farming folk, they might have introduced the principle of joint responsibility as the most expedient way to collect the tributes and to exploit economically the subjected peoples.

It was by such social processes that the non-warlike and stateless society of the Old-Slavonic agricultural folk was incorporated into a military society of power-oriented horsemen of the Eurasian steppes.

6: Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RF1 Great Russia RF1

From its very inception the Russian state was a military Soc i-
721 ety. The military campaigns and territorial expansion were
565 needed in this society to provide land to pay for the services of
181 a class of military nobility whose chief occupation was state service and warfare, not land cultivation. War gave the Czar an opportunity to distribute land grants, to bestow ranks and offices and to win the support of the nobility. At the same time warfare offered an opportunity for the nobles to exert more personal power, to release their destructive urges, and to compensate for indignities and humiliations to which they were constantly exposed on the part of superiors in rank and office. Thus, by engaging these people in constant warfare the Czars directed their aggressive impulses against the enemy instead of against the ruler. The wars were not only a means of occupying a potentially restless and turbulent military class, but they were necessary to enhance the Czar's prestige, to solidify his rule, and to impress his subjects with the idea of his might and invincibility.

723 In such circumstances, prolonged and costly wars were to be avoided. The military nobility, whose loyalty to the Czar was conditioned upon his power and favors, could not be completely depended upon to remain loyal to the Czar under adverse conditions or in defeat. Therefore, in military campaigns the em-
725 phasis had to be put on numerical superiority over the enemy. Another way of fighting the enemies was to frighten them into retreat by sudden and unexpected attacks from ambush combined with wild sounds of the drums, trumpets and shouting, in Mongol fashion. Soldiers and officers were ready to flee if the enemy showed considerable resistance. Their preference was fighting from a distance, or from a place of advantage from where they could annoy the enemy, but hurt themselves least.[16] Hence their most common way of taking cities and fortresses
[726] was by a siege, in the course of which they would force the population to surrender by means of mass starvation, or by provoking internal dissensions and treachery.[17] Small, weak and unprotected adversaries would be threatened into submission by "psychological warfare" methods without even resorting to an open war.[18]

727 In earlier days, the means employed to keep conquered people
1036 in submission were the same as those practiced toward Russian

6: Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RF1 Great Russia RF1

a self-protection on any sign of hostility a preventive war or feud must be initiated.[14] Hence also craftiness and cunning, readiness to lie and to commit perjury[15] and a general wiliness and wariness might easily develop.[16] When a society is to a large extent governmentalized and regimented, such traits are reinforced because in such conditions the feeling of insecurity and lack of trust favor ruthless domineering and coercive submission on all levels of social organization.

In circumstances where power-seeking, extreme self-concern and lack of mutual trust prevail there is a readiness of many people to spy on one another and to inform. There is also an inclination to caluminate as a means of revenge and personal malice.

Destructive aggressiveness and feeling of insecurity, as well as need for succor, may explain the passion for hazardous games and intoxicating drink, and the inclination toward lechery. That liquor is used as a compensatory device which provides a feeling of power and security as contrasted to a reality in which one is cowed into submission is well expressed in folk philosophy. According to a proverb, "When the peasant is drunk, he feels equal to a nobleman; when he is sober he is afraid even of a pig."[17] Hence, in a society in which people find themselves subdued, degraded, and oppressed and where their needs for attachment and acceptance are thwarted, a safe way to rebel against such conditions or to find a convenient substitute may be in drunkenness and debauchery. The early Church documents, as well as the recent evidence, point to the perseverance of such practices:

> Numerous are the sermons devoted to invectives against drunkenness and the pagan character of banquets . . . This wild debauch of popular feasts was preserved until the twentieth century, with the same scenes of drunken fighting and killing as are depicted in this document of the thirteenth century. Orgiasm . . . unrestrained emotional outbursts, stimulated by alcohol, dancing, fighting, or sex, always has been an outstanding feature of Russian temperament.[18]

1 [Sic -- Analyst]

6: Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RF1 Great Russia RF1

Top ruling circles themselves often exhibited a great lack of self-control. A number of rulers showed a tendency toward excesses and extremes that bordered on insanity. Even the Czars of the nineteenth century, in spite of many Western moderating influences, showed tendencies toward instability and extremes in their behavior. Not seldom a new monarch would completely reverse the policies of his predecessor. The rulers tended to show great instability also in attitudes toward their advisers. They would turn suddenly against the old councilors and find new favorites. As a result often "the mighty of yesterday were sent to Siberia or the scaffold." But also barrack and bedchamber revolutions were frequent, reflecting the suddenly changing extremes in moods within the ruling cliques.

Lack of moderation and emotional instability was one of the favored themes of Russian belles-lettres of the nineteenth century. The heroes in these works often display an extremely unbalanced type of behavior. Feodor Chaliapin, who himself took part in producing such types on the Russian stage, states the following:

> . . . When I think of the characters I have created on the Russian stage, I am conscious not so much of the characters themselves as of an all pervading sense of the Russian temperament that is all extremes. . . . It seems as though Russian temperament is entirely devoid of moderation. . . . The fact remains that their contradictions are far more harsh and violent than those of most mentalities. . . . The Russian heart is infinitely pitiful and tender, but at the same time what gross and often completely aimless cruelty and tyranny are to be found in Russian life. The Russian soul is extraodinarily sensitized, but what brutality and lustful suspicion and vulgarism are to be found in human relationships. It is only too true that neither in good nor in evil can the Russian steer a middle course . . .[8]

In *Khovantchina* it is religious fanaticism, and how profound and powerful is that fanaticism! A normal mind could not possibly comprehend that perfect serenity which enables men to die for their belief. They stand on the sheer rampart, utterly oblivious of the stairway by which they might descend to safety. They batter their heads against the wall, unconscious of pain . . . In Rimsky-Korsakov's *Pskovitane* I take the part of Ivan the Terrible. He, the Tsar, cares nothing that the river runs red with blood, so illimitable is his knowledge of

6: Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RF1 Great Russia RF1

Speaking of the character of the peasants Mr. Karnovitch observed, that whoever has to exercise authority over them must above all things guard against indecision, whether in word or act. The Russian always requires a definite command; and in disputes, if the settlement be distinct and pre-emptory, he will be satisfied, whether the sentence is favorable or unfavorable, wise or unwise. If there be hesitation, he immediately becomes intractable, while a resolute command has a magical influence which he cannot resist.[21]

In such a society which is kept together by naked force rather than by moral bonds, breakdown of controls easily results in revolt and upheavals, in widespread bloodshed and destruction. On such occasions, just like the raznochintsy intelligentsia, the peasants, too, tended to revolt against all forms of humiliation and oppressive submission and demanded reestablishment of the old community relations, in which truth and justice and equalitarian brotherhood of man prevailed.

Such forms of peasant protest, which were directed against all the authorities, the family, community elders, the landlord, the Church and the state, will be discussed on the following pages.

18
RELIGIOUS REVOLT OF THE PEASANTRY

I

THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH which in the course of its history came to be completely subjected to the state and was made an instrument of governing, supported the lay authorities in their policies of enserfment. But the state had meagerly rewarded the Church for such services. The revenues from the land donations given to the parishes by the state or by the landlords were not sufficient to maintain the parish priests and their families. The village priests therefore depended for their living upon the fees which the peasants

10: French S-4 (no date) 1951 E16 Slavic Peoples
Great Russia RF1

CHAPTER VII

RUSSIA

181 THE important fact about Russian civilization is that it is Byzantine in its origin, and that in spite of what Toynbee refers to as Russia's "fits of Westernization", its convulsions due to the injection of ideas from the West, (e.g., under Peter the Great), and again in its adoption of Marxism, Byzantine it has remained.

If anyone cares to dispute this about Russian civilization as a whole, he can hardly do so about the Russian Church in particular. In the eleventh century the Russians, or rather their Scandinavian rulers, took over Orthodoxy as one whole thing from Constantinople. It was the reverse process of what happened in the Roman Empire when the State adopted Christianity after it had largely won the people. In Russia the princes accepted Christianity and then gradually imposed it upon their subjects. Christianity had a thousand years' experience behind it, and Orthodoxy had reached its final form when Russia embraced it. No disputes about fundamental Christian doctrines disturbed the Russian Church. The Trinitarian and Christological controversies were settled, the marriage of Christian revelation with Greek philosophy had been consummated, and the conflict to settle the relations between religion and art had been fought out. Together with the liturgical books and all the external apparatus of worship, Russia took over a fixed body of doctrine, a monastic system, a style of building and ornamenting churches, and a body of legal principles.

In all these matters Russia was to introduce modifications and to set a Russian stamp upon them, for in spite of its method of adoption Orthodoxy entered into the soul of the